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a b s t r a c t 
While spillovers among peers in effort and productivity have been studied thoroughly, little is known 
about peer effects in working time. In this paper, we relate a unique measure of peer weekly working 
time from a Dutch panel to men’s working time and to their happiness, in order to ﬁnd out how peer 
working time enters men’s utility function. We ﬁnd that men’s working time increases with that of their 
peers, and that men’s happiness is negatively related to peer working time. Our ﬁndings are consistent 
with a ‘conspicuous work’ model, in which working time is a source of status. The paper therefore pro- 
vides evidence of a new form of status seeking that can drive peer effects in working time. 
© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 
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2. Introduction 
Individuals’ labour supply decisions are likely to be inﬂuenced
y their peers’ behaviour, but it is very diﬃcult to ﬁnd clean evi-
ence of peer effects in working time. The aim of this paper is to
nd which motivations could drive following behaviour in work-
ng time, by studying the role peer working time plays in an in-
ividual’s utility function. To do so, we analyse how peer working
ime relates to both the working time and happiness of Dutch male
orkers. 
Peer behaviour, and peer working time in particular, can enter
n individual utility function in various ways. Apart from the rela-
ive income motive, for which we control in our analysis, we iden-
ify three main models. First, peer working time can generate ex-
ernalities and therefore inﬂuence the marginal utility of leisure or
f work for an individual (see the spillover effects of Grodner and
niesner, 2006 ). Second, an individual can have a preference for
onformity and thus derive utility from working the same number
f hours as his peers (see the conformity effects of Grodner and
niesner, 2006 ). Third, the individual can derive status and there-
ore utility from the difference between his own working time and
hat of his peers (see the emulation model of Clark and Oswald,
998 ). If the individual derives status from working less than his
eers, this is a case of ‘conspicuous leisure’ ( Veblen, 1899 ). Alterna-∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: marion.collewet@uclouvain.be (M. Collewet), 
.degrip@maastrichtuniversity.nl (A. de Grip), dekoning@seor.eur.nl (J. de Koning). 
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214-8043/© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. ively, in what we call the ‘conspicuous work’ case, the individual
erives status from working more than his peers, which increases
is utility. 
We use data from the CentER data panel, a panel survey
f Dutch households, in which respondents are asked about the
eekly working time of their acquaintances. We show that some
f the most obvious sources of bias in reports about peers can be
uled out empirically. Our results build on this ﬁnding. We ﬁrst
nd a positive relation between a man’s working time and that
f his male peers, as found in earlier studies and as predicted by
ll three models mentioned above. Second, we ﬁnd that men are
ess happy if their male peers work more, even after controlling for
heir own working time and for their own and peer income. This
s consistent with a conspicuous work model in which individuals
erive status from their working time and in which the optimal
ehaviour is to imitate one’s peers. We use individual ﬁxed effects
o control for unobserved characteristics, including those that indi-
iduals might share with their peers, and we are able to rule out a
eries of other potential sources of bias. 
We study the role of peer working time in an individual’s utility
unction by examining the relation between peer working time and
ndividual happiness. This means that we use self-reported happi-
ess as a proxy for utility. This approach has yielded interesting
nsights in other ﬁelds such as the study of the potentially imi-
ative character of obesity ( Blanchﬂower et al., 2009; Oswald and
owdthavee, 2007 ). We here apply it to the study of working time.
Earlier studies by Aronsson et al. (1999) , Weinberg et al.
2004) and Grodner and Kniesner (2008) have attempted to de-
ive causal evidence of peer effects in working time from obser-
80 M. Collewet et al. / Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 68 (2017) 79–90 
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2 This is a speciﬁc form of an interaction model. We choose to test this form 
because it is common in the literature ( Vendrik, 1998; Grodner and Kniesner, 2006 ). 
3 To allow for this interpretation, we need to abstract from the issue of the timing 
of work by assuming that everyone works roughly during the same hours. 
4 In a model of labour supply at the household level, Aronsson and Granlund vational data, without having entirely exogenous sources of varia-
tion in peer working time. 1 In this paper, we provide evidence of a
mechanism which can drive following behaviour in working time.
Finding this mechanism provides further support for the existence
of a causal link running from peer to own working time. In addi-
tion, we use direct information on peer labour supply, namely, the
average weekly working time of a man’s acquaintances, as reported
by the respondent himself, while earlier studies use the working
time of workers with characteristics similar to the individual’s (e.g.
Aronsson et al., 1999 ) or a working time variable constructed on
the basis of other peer characteristics described by the individual
( Woittiez and Kapteyn, 1998 ). 
The policy implications of our ﬁndings are twofold. First, fol-
lowing behaviour in working time could call for regulation if it
leads to a rat race in which individuals invest in maintaining their
relative working time position at the cost of things which mat-
ter in absolute terms (such as rest and health). However, we do
not ﬁnd much evidence of such a race for the Netherlands. Sec-
ond, knowing more about the motivations behind peer effects in
working time is important for the design of incentives. The im-
plications for optimal taxation of relative income concerns and of
other positional concerns have been studied by e.g. Aronsson and
Johansson-Stenman (2013, 2014) and Mujcic and Frijters (2015) . If
relative working time also plays a role in people’s utility functions,
this should be taken into account. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section formulates
different models for the different ways in which peer labour sup-
ply can inﬂuence an individual’s utility and his labour supply. It
also gives a brief overview of the empirical literature. Section 3 de-
scribes the data. Section 4 tests the different models formulated
earlier, ﬁrst, by analysing the link between peer working time
and men’s own working time and, second, by studying how peer
working time relates to men’s happiness. Section 5 concludes the
paper. 
2. Social interactions in labour supply 
2.1. Models of social interactions in labour supply 
2.1.1. Externalities 
A ﬁrst way to explain why individuals are affected by their
peers’ working time is to argue that peer working time gener-
ates externalities. Working alone or relaxing alone is arguably less
enjoyable than working or relaxing with others. Kahneman et al.
(2004) provide evidence that time spent alone is the time of the
day that is enjoyed least. Alesina et al. (2006) present a simple
model accounting for what they call a social multiplier effect in
leisure and use it to explain differences in hours worked between
the United States and Europe. Vendrik (1998) develops a model
that explains long-run changes in labour supply by bandwagon
effects, that is, by the fact that individual preferences are inﬂu-
enced by average behaviour in their social group. Grodner and
Kniesner (2006) model a similar idea under the name spillover
effects. Similarly, Stiglitz (2008) argues that the marginal utility
of leisure decreases when others work more because it is more
enjoyable to spend leisure time together. There is indeed evi-
dence that individuals coordinate their working hours to have
common leisure time within the household ( Hamermesh, 2002 )
and within regions ( Jenkins and Osberg, 2004; Georges-Kot et al.,
2014 ). 1 Spillovers at work among peers in effort and productivity have been well doc- 
umented using experiments (see the seminal papers by Falk and Ichino (2006) and 
Mas and Moretti (2009) , and all their followers). But experimental evidence is more 
diﬃcult to obtain for peer effects in working time. 
(
hThe individual’s utility function, in such a case, takes the form 2 
 = U(h, h ¯h, c, X ) (1)
here h stands for the weekly working time of the individual, h¯
s the weekly working time of the relevant peer group, c is the
onsumption of market goods and services, and X is a vector of
ersonal characteristics and tastes. Here U 
h ¯h 
> 0 , meaning that the
ndividual enjoys working more the more his peers work. 
In all the models presented in this section, the labour supply
unction takes the form 
 = H(w, y, h¯, X ) (2)
here w represents the hourly wage rate an individual can com-
and on the labour market and y is his non-labour income. In
he externalities model, H 
h¯ 
> 0 , because an increase in peer hours
eads to an increase in the marginal utility from work (and con-
ersely to a decrease in the marginal utility from leisure) for the
ndividual. 3 
.1.2. Conformity 
Second, peer working time can set a norm to which individu-
ls want to conform. Akerlof’s (1980) theory of social custom and
he identity theory of Akerlof and Kranton (20 0 0) state that an
ndividual’s utility will be enhanced through an increase in iden-
ity utility if he behaves as people from his social category are
xpected. In the case of working time, this means that an indi-
idual will dislike having working hours that deviate greatly from
hat is expected of people in his social category. His peers’ work-
ng hours can be considered a reasonable proxy for what is ex-
ected. Vendrik (2003) develops a speciﬁc version of the theory
f social custom for labour supply. Clark (2003) shows that unem-
loyed men are happier if their peers are unemployed as well and
nterprets this as evidence that unemployment can constitute a so-
ial norm. Grodner and Kniesner (2006) call such normative effects
f the average labour supply in a group conformity effects. 4 Anal-
gous to their model, we can model the individual utility function
n this case as 
 = U((h − h¯ ) 2 , h, c, X ) (3)
here U 
(h −h¯ ) 2 < 0 , since there is a reputation cost of deviating
rom the social norm. This speciﬁcation ensures that there is no
eputation effect if the individual complies to the norm and a neg-
tive one if he deviates from it (see Clark, 2003 ). 
In the labour supply function, again, H 
h¯ 
> 0 , because the longer
 man’s peers work, the more he is willing to work himself, since
e wants to conform to the social norm of working long hours. 5 
ernheim (1994) develops a model in which individuals who care
bout status derived from complying with the social norm tend
o conform to a homogeneous standard of behaviour, even if their
references regarding that behaviour differ. Social norms held by
ndividuals or by the people around them have been shown to
nﬂuence the division of household and market work in couples
 Van der Lippe and Siegers, 1994 ). Stutzer and Lalive (2004) show2015) also incorporate into the utility function similar terms that describe the loss 
in utility which results from deviating from men’s market work norm and women’s 
household work norm. 
5 Grodner and Kniesner (2006) show how conformity effects and spillover effects 
ave different implications for peer effects on labour supply: While the former lead 
to labour supply tending towards the mean of the reference group, the latter lead 
to a snowball increase in labour supply. 
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u  hat individuals in communities with a stronger social norm to
ork tend to have shorter unemployment durations. Burda et al.
2013) ﬁnd that theories based on social norms are consistent with
he distribution of work across genders in a number of countries. 
.1.3. Status: conspicuous leisure or conspicuous work? 
A third way to explain social interactions in labour supply is
o start from the idea that individuals derive status from the dif-
erence between their own labour supply and that of others. Clark
nd Oswald (1998) develop a general model of the behavioural im-
lications of striving for status through differentiation. Applying
heir model to the case in which status can be derived from labour
upply behaviour, one obtains an individual utility function of the
orm 
 = U(s, h, c, X ) (4)
here s is a status term, which in our case can take the form
 = h − h¯ – in the case of what Clark and Oswald (1998) call ad-
itive comparisons – or s = h/ ¯h – in the case of ratio comparisons.
ow exactly this status term affects individual utility depends on
hether individuals derive status from having more leisure than
heir peers or from working more. 
Veblen (1899) coined the concept of conspicuous leisure, that
s, the idea that individuals can prove their status not only by con-
uming expensive and exclusive goods (conspicuous consumption),
ut also by showing that they do not have to work much and can
fford to learn all kinds of skills that are not directly productive.
rijters and Leigh (2008) depict individuals in present times as
aking trade-offs between investing in conspicuous consumption
nd in conspicuous leisure and show that the balance is shifting
owards the ﬁrst element as mobility increases and leisure activi-
ies are less easily registered by one’s environment. In the presence
f conspicuous leisure, we have U s < 0 and therefore also U h¯ > 0 . 
However, individuals nowadays also signal their status to oth-
rs through working time itself. In many social groups, an indi-
idual can indeed increase his status by telling everyone that he
s very busy, preferably even more than others around him. Sym-
etrically, he can lose status if he has less to do than others. We
abel the case in which working time is viewed as a provider of
tatus conspicuous work. Clark and Oswald (1998 , p. 144) cite em-
lation in labour supply as a possible application of their model:
One example is the Japanese-style case of corporate cultures in
hich everyone works at high levels of effort. When performance
ives status, either directly or through added earnings, the model
redicts effort-following’. Experimental results by Falk and Ichino
2006) also seem in line with the idea of conspicuous work: They
nd that individuals are more productive in their job if they share
 room with another worker than if they work alone. This is con-
istent with the hypothesis that the workers derive status from
heir relative productivity. This suggests that there is, by analogy, a
ossibility for individuals to derive status from their working time.
heir results are also in line with an individual utility function that
s concave in status: They ﬁnd that sharing a room with another
orker seems to increase productivity more for workers who are
ess productive. One can imagine that the increase in productivity
s larger because the increase in status is also larger for those who
ag further behind their peers in terms of productivity and there-
ore status. In the conspicuous work model, we have U s > 0 and
herefore U 
h¯ 
< 0 . 
Clark and Oswald (1998) show that if individual utility func-
ions are concave in social comparisons, those seeking status will
end to conform to the behaviour of others. This has the inter-
sting implication that both conspicuous leisure and conspicuous
ork will lead to following behaviour in labour supply. In terms of
he labour supply function presented above, we have H 
h¯ 
> 0 in the
onspicuous leisure case, because if an individual’s peers reduceheir working time, the individual would need to reduce his as well
o maintain his relative leisure position. Conversely, if his peers in-
rease their working time, he can afford to increase his without
osing status from conspicuous leisure while increasing the util-
ty he derives from consumption through increased income from
ork. 
In the case of conspicuous work, we also have H 
h¯ 
> 0 : If an
ndividual’s peers increase their working time, the individual will
mitate them to maintain the status he derives from conspicuous
ork. The labour supply of his peers motivates a man to work
ore hours to improve his relative working time position. The
orking time of his peers inﬂuences his behaviour because of his
reference for the status of a ‘hard worker’. 
To sum up, all three models of social interactions in labour sup-
ly predict a positive effect of peer working time on individual
orking time, but for different reasons, associated with different
oles of peer working time in the individual utility function. 
.2. Peer effects in working time: empirical evidence and link with 
appiness 
.2.1. Empirical evidence of peer effects in working time 
There is evidence that individuals conform to the labour sup-
ly of those around them. Peer labour supply has been found to
ave an inﬂuence on mothers’ labour market participation ( Maurin
nd Moschion, 2009 ), exit rates from welfare programmes ( Van der
laauw and Van Ours, 2003 ), exit from unemployment ( Topa,
001 ), and effort provision of workers ( Ichino and Maggi, 20 0 0;
alk and Ichino, 2006 ). As far as the number of hours worked is
oncerned, various studies ﬁnd evidence of peer effects. Woittiez
nd Kapteyn (1998) ﬁnd that, for married women in the Nether-
ands, the desired number of hours worked is inﬂuenced by the
orking time of a peer group constructed on the basis of the char-
cteristics of the women themselves and the characteristics of their
eers as reported by these women. Aronsson et al. (1999) ﬁnd that
he number of hours worked by Swedish married men is inﬂu-
nced by the number of hours worked in a social reference group
eﬁned on the basis of age, educational level, and the presence
f children in the household. Weinberg et al. (2004) ﬁnd that the
ale employment rate in the neighbourhood inﬂuences the an-
ual number of hours worked by young American men. Grodner
nd Kniesner (2008) construct a peer group based on a measure of
conomic proximity and ﬁnd that this peer group’s working time
s positively related to the working time of married American men.
The estimation of peer effects raises, however, a number of
ethodological problems. First, most studies examining the effect
f peer behaviour on labour supply have to make strong assump-
ions about the peer group. The studies about peer effects in work-
ng time mentioned above mainly construct peer groups based on
emographic and/or geographic criteria. The only exception is the
tudy of Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998) , who construct their measure
f peer working time using information provided by the respon-
ents about whom they consider to be their peer group. Soetevent
2006 , p. 222) regrets that this strategy ‘was since then not copied
y other researchers’. To our knowledge, subjective data about peer
roups has still not been used in more recent years to estimate
eer effects on labour supply. 
A second problem is that one has to ﬁnd a strategy to distin-
uish effects really caused by peer behaviour from what Manski
1993) calls correlated effects, that is, effects that are simply due
o the fact that individuals and their peers share unobserved char-
cteristics or that they are affected by the same environmental fac-
ors or shocks. Aronsson et al. (1999) use cohort ﬁxed effects to
ccount for changes in the preferences of the reference group as
 whole, which enables them to control for time-invariant shared
nobservables, but not for common shocks or shared unobserv-
82 M. Collewet et al. / Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 68 (2017) 79–90 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. N 
Happiness 4.03 0.626 1 5 8203 
Net household income 31,581 14,685 454 111,473 8203 
Net peer household income (categories) 7.499 1.368 1 11 8203 
Weekly hours 41.653 9.137 1 72 8203 
Male peers’ weekly hours 39.628 5.49 1 70 8203 
Looking for another job 0.195 0.397 0 1 8203 
Subjective health 4.064 0.636 1 5 8203 
Age 43.958 9.083 23 60 8203 
Number of children 1.107 1.19 0 6 8203 
Partner 0.827 0.378 0 1 8203 
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6 We focus on men, as do Aronsson et al. (1999) , Weinberg et al. (2004) , Grodner 
and Kniesner (2008) , because the distribution of their working hours is quite 
strongly concentrated around a full-time workweek, while there is much more vari- 
ation in the weekly working times of women. This raises the question which role 
social norms and peer effects play among men. First results about women suggest 
that peer working time does not inﬂuence their labour supply and happiness. Fur- 
ther investigation of this is left for future research. We follow Booth and Van Ours 
(2013) for the age interval. 
7 In the robustness checks in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we show that including 
non-working individuals and those with non-working peers does not substantially 
change the results. 
8 Those who answered that they ‘don’t know’ were excluded from the sample. 
They represent less than 1% of the sample. ables that would vary over time. Grodner and Kniesner (2008) in-
strument the mean labour supply of a reference group using the
mean labour supply in the adjacent reference group. For this tech-
nique to solve the problems mentioned, they have to assume that
the labour supply in this adjacent reference group is not correlated
with an individual’s own labour supply, that is, no unobservables
or common shocks are shared with this adjacent group and the
mean labour supply of this adjacent group has no direct inﬂuence
on men’s own labour supply. Finally, Weinberg et al. (2004) use in-
dividual ﬁxed effects and individual-speciﬁc experience proﬁles to
correct for the inﬂuence of shared unobservables, both time invari-
ant and time varying, but they cannot entirely rule out the effect
of common shocks. 
From the literature, we can conclude that there is evidence that
a man’s working time is inﬂuenced by the labour supply of his en-
vironment, even if not all methodological problems have been re-
solved yet. Understanding the potential mechanisms behind such
peer effects could help us to better understand whether and how
peer working time actually inﬂuences individual working time. 
2.2.2. Peer working time and happiness 
Peer inﬂuences, or social inﬂuences in general, are often men-
tioned in the literature as one of the possible drivers behind the
link between working time and subjective well-being: ‘Social cus-
tom and conditioning might affect subjective well-being and the
gender division of labour’ ( Booth and Van Ours, 2008 , p. F79);
‘Men might be more satisﬁed with longer working hours because
the social norm is to work full-time’ ( Rätzel, 2009 , p. 21). Booth
and Van Ours (2009) explain their ﬁnding that working full-time
is positively associated with the life satisfaction of men and neg-
atively associated with that of women by traditional gender iden-
tities. However, to our knowledge, the way in which peer working
time inﬂuences individual well-being has not yet been examined. 
In this paper, we examine the link between peer working time
and happiness to obtain a better picture of an individual’s util-
ity function. We are aware of the fact that self-reported happi-
ness is only an imperfect proxy for utility, since individuals make
mistakes in predicting their happiness when they make decisions
( Kahneman and Thaler, 2006 ) and sometimes even seem to con-
sciously choose something else than maximizing their happiness
( Benjamin et al., 2012 ). Still, we believe that self-reported happi-
ness and utility are suﬃciently correlated for an analysis of happi-
ness to yield interesting insights into characteristics of the utility
function. Happiness data are used to study potential imitative be-
haviour by Oswald and Powdthavee (2007) and Blanchﬂower et al.
(2009) , who apply the model of Clark and Oswald (1998) to the
case of obesity. They show that relative weight inﬂuences indi-
vidual happiness and that this could lead to imitative obesity. We
build on these contributions and test the model of Clark and Os-
wald (1998) along with two concurrent models in the case of rela-
tive labour supply. . Data 
.1. The CentER data panel 
We use the CentER data panel, a panel survey held since 1993
mong Dutch households. The estimation sample consists of men
ged 23–60 surveyed in the years 1994–2011. 6 Table 1 presents de-
criptive statistics for the main variables in our estimation sample.
We choose to focus on individuals with a positive weekly work-
ng time, unlike Booth and Van Ours (20 08, 20 09, 2013) , because
e want to determine the effects of weekly working time and
ould like to avoid picking up any effect of being employed rather
han unemployed. To rule out any effect on happiness of being em-
loyed while one’s peers are unemployed, we also exclude individ-
als who report zero as the average working time of their peers
nd those who indicate that most of their peers do not have a paid
ob. 7 
The number of hours that respondents work is measured by
 number of questions with respect to their normal (contractual)
eekly working hours, their usual working hours, and any addi-
ional hours they work in a second job. To measure weekly work-
ng time, we add up the usual number of hours and hours worked
n second jobs. The happiness of respondents was measured by
heir response to the question: ‘All in all, to what extent do you
onsider yourself a happy person?’, to which they could answer
sing a 5-point scale ranging from ‘very happy’ to ‘very unhappy’. 8 
ig. A.1 presents histograms of the distributions of the happiness
nd hours variables that are central to the analysis. 
.2. Reports about peers and their reliability 
The questions about an individual’s peers were introduced as
ollows: ‘The following questions concern your circle of acquain-
ances, that is, the people with whom you associate frequently,
uch as friends, neighbours, acquaintances, or maybe people at
ork’. A series of questions follows about the age of most of the
espondent’s acquaintances (in ﬁve-year age groups), the number
f persons in the household of most of these acquaintances, the
verage total net income per year of those households (in 11 cate-
ories, see Table C.1), the level of education of most acquaintances
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Fig. 1. Scatterplot of peer hours against own hours. 
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t  in seven categories), and the kind of employment of most ac-
uaintances. The labour supply of the people in the respondents’
nvironment is measured using two separate questions for men
nd women, formulated as follows: ‘If you think of the men among
our acquaintances, how many hours per week do they work on
verage?’. 
The Tables C.2 and Table C.3 compare the demographic charac-
eristics of men in our sample to those of their peers. The tables
how that men in our sample are generally similar to their peers
ut that, as one could expect, not everyone classiﬁes the majority
f their peers as similar to themselves in terms of age, education
evel, household size, and so forth. This demonstrates that directly
ollecting information on peer characteristics has real added value.
However, answers to questions about peers, and reports of peer
orking time in particular, might be biased in different ways. First,
espondents could use their own working time as a proxy for their
eers’, in which case reports about peer working time are not in-
ormative. Figure 1 shows how peer working time relates to an
ndividual’s own working time. The answers about peer working
ime are concentrated along horizontal lines, which seems to in-
icate that the respondents used the focal points constituted by a
umber of standard weekly work durations (e.g. 30, 36, 38, 40, 45,
0, and 60 h). 9 If individuals would use their own working time
s a proxy for their peers’ working time, most observations would
e concentrated on the 45-degree line. We see that this is not the
ase, which is reassuring. 
Second, some general characteristics of individuals (e.g. self-
onﬁdence) are likely to inﬂuence both their happiness and the
ay they perceive their peers’ working time. However, the panel
tructure of the data enables us to clean out the effect of any such
ime-invariant characteristic. 9 In particular, there is a mass point at 40 h for peer working time (see Fig. A.1). 
his suggests that respondents use this as an anchor if they see their peers as work- 
ng full-time without overtime. To check whether this mass point inﬂuences our 
esults, we also estimated our main models while including a dummy indicating 
hether peer working time was equal to 40. Our results were not affected, show- 
ng that anchoring does not inﬂuence our results. 
T  
t  
s  
F  
h  
s  Third, one can think of time-varying factors which inﬂuence the
ay a respondent estimates his peers’ working time as well as his
abour supply and happiness. For instance, someone who works
ess than he would like might both be less happy and overesti-
ate the working time of his peers. Then, the negative effect of
eer working time on happiness will be overestimated. We show
hat this does not seem to be the case by controlling for over- and
nderemployment in Section 4.2.3 . Admittedly, we cannot entirely
xclude the possibility that other changes occur in the individual’s
ife which inﬂuence his happiness and labour supply as well as his
eports about peer working time. Moreover, a respondent’s happi-
ess level might inﬂuence his reports about his peers. The inter-
retation of our results below as an effect of peer working time on
wn labour supply and own happiness is subject to the assump-
ion that these possibilities are either not realized or do not play
n important role. 
One way to check the reliability of respondents’ reports about
heir peers is to compare the relations among reported peer char-
cteristics with the relations among the same set of own charac-
eristics. If these relations are similar, this gives us some conﬁ-
ence that reports about peer characteristics are not severely bi-
sed by the respondents’ own characteristics or situation. Table C.4
resents the estimation results of regressions of peer household in-
ome and male peers’ working hours on the other peer character-
stics measured in the survey, next to regressions of the respon-
ent’s own household income and own weekly working hours on
wn characteristics. In both regressions, all variables are standard-
zed to correct for the fact that variables concerning the respon-
ent and variables concerning his peers are often measured on dif-
erent scales. Overall, the coeﬃcients on own characteristics and
hose on peer characteristics have the same order of magnitude.
he differences in coeﬃcients on the age variables may be due to
he fact that the age range is limited for the respondents them-
elves in our sample, while the age range for their peers is not.
or many variables (household size, education level, hours worked,
ousehold income), the conﬁdence intervals overlap. This is reas-
uring, as it suggests that there are no severe biases in answers
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Table 2 
Weekly hours worked: OLS model with ﬁxed-effects. 
(1) (2) (3) 
Male peers’ weekly hours 0.0999 ∗∗∗ 0.0939 ∗∗∗
(0.0285) (0.0288) 
Log net peer household income 0.5682 
(0.5811) 
Age 0.8885 ∗∗∗ 0.8695 ∗∗∗ 0.8529 ∗∗∗
(0.2721) (0.2696) (0.2703) 
Age 2 −0.0113 ∗∗∗ −0.0110 ∗∗∗ −0.0109 ∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
Number of children −0.1005 −0.0977 −0.0999 
(0.2670) (0.2592) (0.2601) 
Partner 0.4684 0.4310 0.3965 
(0.7843) (0.7826) (0.7815) 
Constant 25.0427 ∗∗∗ 21.1676 ∗∗∗ 20.8889 ∗∗∗
(6.1088) (6.3047) (6.3241) 
Observations 8203 8203 8203 
Individuals 3042 3042 3042 
R 2 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Standard errors (clustered by individual) in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01; Year dummies included as additional controls. 
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11 The coeﬃcient on peer income, however, is larger when peer hours are not 
included in the model. 
12 We are aware that including a lag of the dependent variable as a regressor in 
a ﬁxed effects model leads to bias ( Nickell, 1981 ). In a pooled model, the coeﬃ- 
cient on peer working time drops by half when lagged individual’s own hours are about peers. We lose about a quarter of the observations on work-
ing men aged 23 to 60 due to non-response on the peer labour
supply questions. Using the test designed by Wooldridge (1995) ,
we ﬁnd that this does not lead to selection bias in our estimates
(results available from the authors). The response to the ques-
tion about the average income of the respondent’s acquaintances
is lower (only about 50%) than for other items relating to peers. To
avoid losing too many observations, we predicted the missing val-
ues for peer income as the linear prediction resulting from estima-
tion of an ordered logit model with measured peer income as the
dependent variable and measured peer characteristics as the inde-
pendent variables (see Appendix B for more information about the
prediction of peer income and about the cleaning of the data). 
4. Estimations 
4.1. Peer working time and individuals’ own working time 
All three models of social interactions in labour supply dis-
cussed above predict that the relation between individuals’ own
and peer working time should be positive. Therefore, we start by
estimating this relation. 
4.1.1. Estimation method 
We estimate a ﬁxed effects model. This is useful not only to
control for unobserved heterogeneity among individuals but also,
more importantly, to take into account unobserved characteristics
that individuals can share with their peers and which can account
for part of a positive relation between their own and peer working
time. The standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 
We do not observe hourly wages directly. Computing the hourly
wage on the basis of total earnings and hours worked would cause
a bias in its coeﬃcients, since hours worked is the dependent vari-
able in our analysis. Therefore, we follow Weinberg et al. (2004) by
estimating a reduced form of the labour supply equation that does
not include hourly wage. 10 
4.1.2. Estimation results 
Table 2 presents the estimation results. 
We ﬁrst estimate a baseline model that does not include peer
working time (column 1). Peer working time is added to this base-
line model in column 2. The coeﬃcient on the working time of10 Including hourly wage and non-earned income as regressors in the model does 
not cause the coeﬃcient on peer working time to change. 
i
n
dale peers is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. It is however
mall (one additional hour worked by peers corresponds to 6 more
inutes worked by the individual), which suggests that individuals
end to follow the labour supply of their peers without engaging in
n explosive rat race. The working time of female peers, when in-
luded in the model, is not signiﬁcant (results available from the
uthors). In addition, including the hours worked by the individ-
al’s partner does not affect the coeﬃcient on peer working time
results available from the authors). The coeﬃcient on peer work-
ng time remains positive and even hardly changes when peer in-
ome is added to the model as a regressor (column 3). 11 
Our results are in line with evidence of peer effects on working
ime found in earlier studies. In their estimation of peer effects
n labour supply, Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998) and Grodner and
niesner (2008) include a lag of individuals’ own working time to
ontrol for habit formation in the labour supply. Following their
xample (see column 1 of Table C.5), we ﬁnd that habit formation
ndeed plays a role, but that the coeﬃcient on peer working time
emains virtually unchanged. 12 
.1.3. Robustness checks 
We estimate a number of additional models to check for the
ole of various potential sources of bias in our estimation results.
able 3 presents an overview of the results of various robustness
hecks we conducted. The ﬁxed effects baseline model reproduced
n row 0 of the table is the point of reference. 
1. First, we want to examine the role of possible feedback effects
from the individual’s own working time to peer working time
(endogenous effects in Manski’s (1993) terminology). Therefore,
we also estimate the model replacing the present value of peer
working time by its one-year lagged value. The estimation re-
sults are presented in column 2 of Table C.5. The coeﬃcient on
the lag of peer working time is still positive and signiﬁcant. 13 
2. Second, to account for what Manski calls exogenous effects, we
check whether observable characteristics of peers other than
their working time have an inﬂuence on an individual’s work-
ing time. We include the peer characteristics that are measured
in our dataset as additional regressors in the model. The esti-
mation results are presented in column 3 of Table C.5. We ﬁnd
that most added peer characteristics have no signiﬁcant inﬂu-
ence on an individual’s working time. Most importantly, con-
trolling for additional peer characteristics does not affect the
coeﬃcient on peer working time much. 
3. Third, we argued above that estimating a ﬁxed effects model
eliminates the role of time-invariant characteristics that indi-
viduals might share with their peers and which might inﬂuence
both their peers’ and their own working time. To check this
argument, we compare our estimates with those of a pooled
model in Table C.6. This table shows that the coeﬃcient on peer
working time is indeed four times larger in pooled estimations,
which conﬁrms that using ﬁxed effects corrects for the role of
confounding factors. 
4. Then, a man’s working time and that of his peers can both
be determined by external factors, such as labour demand. We
therefore estimate a model in which the dependent variable is
no longer actual hours worked but, instead, the man’s desiredncluded, but both variables remain signiﬁcant at the 1% level. 
13 Individuals can change peers over time. We assume that the peer group does 
ot change much from one year to another and, also, that the working time of peers 
oes not change much. Further lags of peer working time were not signiﬁcant. 
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Table 3 
Overview of robustness checks for the weekly hours estimations. 
Potential source of bias Estimation method Coeﬃcient on peer working time 
0 Fixed-effects model (baseline) 0.0939 ∗∗∗
1 Reverse causality (Endogenous effects) Use lag of peer working time 0.0611 ∗∗
2 Inﬂuence of other peer characteristics 
(Exogenous effects) 
Control for other observed peer characteristics 0.0857 ∗∗∗
3 Time-invariant unobservables 
(Correlated effects 1) 
Pooled model for comparison with ﬁxed-effects 
model 
0.4158 ∗∗∗
4 Common shocks (e.g. in labour 
demand) (Correlated effects 2) 
Desired working time as dependent variable 0.0677 ∗
5 Endogenous controls Drop potentially endogenous controls 0.1001 ∗∗∗
6 Potentially asymmetric effect Include interaction with dummies for increase 
and decrease in peer working hours 
Decrease: 0.097 ∗∗ Increase: 0.091 ∗∗∗
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p  working time 14 (Table C.7), because the desired working time is
less likely to be inﬂuenced by labour demand conditions than
the actual working time. The estimation results show that peer
working time still has a positive inﬂuence on desired work-
ing time. This suggests that the positive relation is not purely
driven by demand factors. 
5. Next, for the reader worried about the potential endogeneity of
control variables such as peer income, having a partner, or the
number of children, we also re-estimated our model leaving out
these control variables. The main results were not affected (see
Table 3 ; full results available from the authors). 
6. It is also important to check whether men’s labour supply re-
acts in the same way to an increase and a decrease in peer
working time. The main model presented in Table 2 assumes
that the reaction has the same absolute value in both cases.
In order to check whether this is the case, we include in the
model interactions of peers’ working hours with dummies in-
dicating whether peers’ working hours increased or decreased
compared to the year before. The estimation results are re-
ported in Table C.8. The effect of a decrease in peer working
time seems to be slightly larger than the effect of an increase,
but the difference is not statistically signiﬁcant. 
inally, the reader might be worried about selection bias, because
e estimate a labour supply model using only working individuals
ith working peers. However, when we remove the restriction of
he positive individual’s own and peer working time on our sam-
le, the sample size increases only to n = 9261, with 3346 indi-
iduals. This means that about 90% of individuals in our sample
ork and have peers who work. The chances of selection bias are
herefore very limited. 
To sum up, we have addressed the role of time-invariant char-
cteristics shared with peers, labour demand conditions, reverse
ausality (feedback effects), and selection bias. 15 All in all, we con-
ider the results of these robustness checks to be evidence that
eer working time has a positive inﬂuence on a man’s own work-
ng time. This is consistent with any of the models presented above
n which peer working time enters the agent’s utility function. In
he following section, we want to discriminate between these con-
urrent models by turning to the link between peer working time
nd happiness. 14 The question about desired hours is phrased as follows: ‘How many hours per 
eek WOULD YOU LIKE to work in total? If you have more than one job, give the 
um total for all jobs’. 
15 To try and tackle any potential remaining issues, we also estimated a model 
n which we instrumented for peer working time using peer age as an instrument. 
he effect of peer working time became so imprecisely estimated that it could not 
e statistically distinguished from zero. Consequently, the Hausman test did not re- 
ect the null hypothesis of exogeneity of peer working time. Overall, the evidence 
ielded by instrumenting peer working time was inconclusive. 
2
c
e
t
T
w
h.2. Peer working time and happiness 
.2.1. Estimation method 
In this section, we study the relation between peer working
ime and happiness of male workers. Earlier research has demon-
trated that in studies of self-reported happiness, it is crucial to
ake individual ﬁxed effects into account (e.g. Lykken and Tellegen,
996 ). Moreover, individual ﬁxed effects offer a partial solution to
he problem of potential endogeneity of an individual’s own and
eer working time. If individuals share some time-invariant char-
cteristics with their peers that inﬂuence both working time and
appiness, not controlling for them could bias the coeﬃcient of
eer working time. 
For simplicity, we estimate a linear model with ﬁxed effects.
ecause our dependent variable is discrete, we also estimate or-
ered logit models with individual ﬁxed effects for comparison
urposes. Using both the method of Ferrer-i Carbonell and Fri-
ters (2004) (FCF) and the ‘blow-up and cluster’ (BUC) method of
aetschmann et al. (2015) , 16 we ﬁnd, as Ferrer-i Carbonell and Fri-
ters (2004) , that the estimation results are not substantially differ-
nt when using ordered logits with ﬁxed effects (see Table C.9). 
.2.2. Estimation results 
Table 4 presents the estimation results. 
In column 1, we estimate a model without peer working time
s a baseline model for comparison purposes. To allow for possible
on-linear effects of hours on happiness, the estimation includes a
uadratic term for weekly hours. 17 
In columns 2 to 5, we test the three models of social interac-
ions presented in Section 2 by examining how peer working time
elates to individual happiness. Column 2 presents a test of the ex-
ernalities hypothesis by including the interaction of a man’s own
orking time with his peers’. If individuals enjoy working more
hen their peers work more hours, one would expect a positive
ign on the coeﬃcient of the interaction term. This is not the case
ere. The coeﬃcient is negative, very small, and statistically in-
igniﬁcant, which seems to invalidate the externalities hypothe-
is. 18 
To test the conformity model, we include the square of the dif-
erence between a man’s working time and the weekly hours of his
eers (column 3). One would expect the coeﬃcient on this vari-16 We are thankful to Andy Dickerson for providing us with his code ( Hole et al., 
011 ). 
17 In column 1, happiness is found to peak at 51 hours per week. In the other 
olumns, the optimal number of own weekly working hours ranges from 44 to 53, 
xcept for column 2 where the inclusion of the interaction term with peer working 
ime changes the interpretation of the coeﬃcients on own working time variables. 
he effect of weekly hours on happiness is likely to be overestimated because own 
orking time is not exogenous. 
18 The interaction term is not signiﬁcant either in a model including only a linear 
ours term. 
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Table 4 
Happiness: OLS model with ﬁxed-effects. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Weekly hours 0.0094 ∗∗ 0.0174 ∗∗ 0.0197 ∗∗∗ 0.0096 ∗∗ 0.0071 
(0.0042) (0.0088) (0.0063) (0.0042) (0.0044) 
Weekly hours 2 −0.0 0 01 ∗ −0.0 0 01 −0.0 0 02 ∗∗∗ −0.0 0 01 ∗ −0.0 0 01 
(0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 01) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 01) 
Own hours ∗ peer hours −0.0 0 02 
(0.0 0 02) 
(Own hours - peer hours) 2 0.0 0 02 ∗∗
(0.0 0 01) 
Male peers’ weekly hours 0.0059 −0.0041 ∗∗
(0.0092) (0.0020) 
Working less than peers −0.0492 ∗∗
(0.0239) 
Working more than peers −0.0048 
(0.0187) 
Log net household income 0.0264 ∗ 0.0256 ∗ 0.0255 ∗ 0.0263 ∗ 0.0269 ∗
(0.0147) (0.0146) (0.0148) (0.0147) (0.0147) 
Log net peer household income −0.0676 −0.0387 −0.0332 −0.0438 −0.0641 
(0.0438) (0.0440) (0.0447) (0.0442) (0.0442) 
Looking for another job −0.0527 ∗∗∗ −0.0535 ∗∗∗ −0.0531 ∗∗∗ −0.0527 ∗∗∗ −0.0519 ∗∗∗
(0.0198) (0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0197) (0.0197) 
Subjective health 0.0819 ∗∗∗ 0.0825 ∗∗∗ 0.0818 ∗∗∗ 0.0824 ∗∗∗ 0.0823 ∗∗∗
(0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) 
Age −0.0330 −0.0338 ∗ −0.0344 ∗ −0.0332 −0.0329 
(0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0204) 
Age 2 0.0 0 04 ∗ 0.0 0 04 ∗ 0.0 0 04 ∗ 0.0 0 04 ∗ 0.0 0 04 ∗
(0.0 0 02) (0.0 0 02) (0.0 0 02) (0.0 0 02) (0.0 0 02) 
Number of children −0.0036 −0.0026 −0.0029 −0.0038 −0.0032 
(0.0206) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0207) (0.0207) 
Partner 0.3195 ∗∗∗ 0.3194 ∗∗∗ 0.3191 ∗∗∗ 0.3194 ∗∗∗ 0.3214 ∗∗∗
(0.0862) (0.0863) (0.0863) (0.0863) (0.0862) 
Constant 3.7044 ∗∗∗ 3.4 84 8 ∗∗∗ 3.4890 ∗∗∗ 3.8357 ∗∗∗ 3.7623 ∗∗∗
(0.5005) (0.6324) (0.5151) (0.5099) (0.5015) 
Observations 8203 8203 8203 8203 8203 
Individuals 3042 3042 3042 3042 3042 
R 2 0.035 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.036 
Standard errors (clustered by individual) in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; Year dummies 
included as additional controls. 
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T  able to be negative if men dislike having a working time that dif-
fers too much from that of their peers. However, the coeﬃcient is
positive and very small even if statistically signiﬁcant, which is at
odds with the idea that men conform to their peers’ working time
because of a preference for conformity. 
In column 4, we test the status model by introducing male
peer working time into the regression. Note that this is practi-
cally equivalent to introducing the difference between an individ-
ual’s own and peer working time, since we already control for the
individual’s own working time. Conspicuous leisure would imply
a positive coeﬃcient on peer working time, while the conspicu-
ous work model would predict the opposite. Peer working time
appears to be negatively associated with happiness, therefore sup-
porting the latter model. 19 The coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant,
although the effect size is small. One additional hour of peer work-
ing time corresponds to a drop in happiness by 0.6% of a standard
deviation. 20 Interestingly, only the working time of male peers is19 We also tried including the ratio of one’s own weekly hours to peer weekly 
hours, to test the ratio comparison version of the model. This lead to similar re- 
sults, i.e. the coeﬃcient on the ratio is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. We also 
estimated a model including the squared value of male peers’ working hours. In 
this model, the relation between peer working time and happiness appeared to be 
negative for peer hours below 65 hours per week. (All results available from the 
authors.) 
20 An additional hour of peer working time seems to be equivalent to a drop by 
15% in household income. However, the coeﬃcient on household income is unusu- 
ally small compared to studies based on other data. If we used the coeﬃcient on 
household income in the study of Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters (2004) , an addi- 
tional hour of peer working time would correspond to a drop in household income 
by about 7.5%. 
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oigniﬁcantly associated with men’s happiness. The working time of
emale peers is not signiﬁcant when taken up in the regression (re-
ults available from the authors). 
Our results suggest that relative working time can be a source
f status for male workers. Clark and Oswald (1998) show that if
tility is concave in status, individuals will tend to follow the be-
aviour of their peers. The positive relation found between a man’s
wn working time and the number of hours worked by his peers
uggests that this should be the case here. We test for this in col-
mn 5. Here, we create dummies for working fewer hours than
eers, the same number of hours, or more hours. We classify an in-
ividual as working the same number of hours as his peers if the
bsolute value of the difference between his peers’ working time
nd his own is two hours or less. The results indicate that work-
ng less than one’s peers is negatively related to a man’s happi-
ess, while working more is not signiﬁcantly related to happiness.
his is in line with the idea of a concave relationship between sta-
us, measured as the difference between a man’s own hours and
is peers’ hours, and utility. 21 The model speciﬁcation in column 5
s our preferred one, because the results are not sensitive to out-21 We also estimated models with the log or a quadratic of status, measured as the 
ifference between own and peer hours or the ratio of own to peer hours. However, 
he estimation results of these models were very sensitive to outliers, in particular 
o a limited number of observations for which the difference between own and 
eer working time takes extremely high values. Including a cubic term of the sta- 
us variable in the model or running a local polynomial regression of happiness on 
tatus shows that the utility function is concave over the range of hours differences 
n which most observations are concentrated, but convex for especially high values 
f these differences in hours (results available from the authors). 
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Table 5 
Overview of robustness checks for the happiness estimations. 
Potential source of bias Estimation method Coeﬃcient on working 
less than peers 
0 Fixed-effects model (baseline) −0.049 ∗∗
1 Relative income effect Alternative measures of peer income: 
– Predicted wage from Mincer regression −0.041 ∗
– Reported peer income without imputed values −0.052 ∗
– Agreement with statements about relative income −0.045 
2 Effect of working part-time Include a dummy for part-time as additional control −0.041 
3 Working time mismatch as a 
confounder 
Control for over- and underemployment −0.049 ∗∗
4 Inﬂuence of other peer characteristics 
(Exogenous effects) 
Control for other observed peer characteristics −0.048 ∗∗
5 Time-invariant unobservables 
(Correlated effects 1) 
Pooled model for comparison with ﬁxed-effects model −0.010 
6 Endogenous controls Drop potentially endogenous controls −0.046 ∗∗
7 Job change as potential confounding 
factor 
Control for tenure −0.049 ∗∗
8 Selection bias Include non-working individuals and those with 
non-working peers for comparison purposes 
−0.055 ∗∗
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 iers. Moreover, this speciﬁcation does not favour either the addi-
ive or the ratio comparisons model, since working less than peers
an represent either a negative difference between own and peer
ours or a ratio of own to peer hours smaller than 1. The size of
he coeﬃcient indicates that working less than one’s peers is as-
ociated with a drop in happiness by about 0.05 points on a scale
rom 1 to 5, i.e. about 8% of a standard deviation in happiness. Al-
ogether, the results presented here explain why we ﬁnd evidence
f peer effects in our labour supply regressions, but only of very
mall magnitude. 22 
.2.3. Robustness checks 
We conduct a number of robustness checks to rule out factors
hat may cause a spurious relation between peer working time and
appiness and to eliminate other potential sources of bias. All ro-
ustness checks are carried out on our preferred speciﬁcation (col-
mn 5 in Table 4 ). 23 Table 5 presents an overview of the robust-
ess checks we conducted. For reference, the coeﬃcient obtained
n our preferred model is reproduced in row 0 of the table. 
1. First, one might be worried that peer hours actually capture
a relative income effect. Since we have a rather rough mea-
sure of peer income, which is imputed for a part of the es-
timation sample, the effect of peer hours could be a relative
income effect that is not being captured by the peer income
variable if peer hours are more precisely measured. 24 To check
for this possibility, we use three alternative measures of rela-
tive income. The estimation results are presented in Table C.10.
In column 1, we estimate a version of the model in which the
predicted wage from a Mincer regression is taken as the mea-
sure of peer household income. This predicted wage is a more
precise measure of relative income ( Clark and Oswald, 1996 ).
The coeﬃcient on working less than one’s peers becomes a bit
smaller, and statistical signiﬁcance decreases (probably due to
the drop in sample size), but the coeﬃcient remains similar. In22 We also estimated the model with job satisfaction and career satisfaction as de- 
endent variables. Job satisfaction is negatively related to peer working time, and 
ight therefore be a channel through which working less than peers affects happi- 
ess. Career satisfaction is not related to working less than peers. However, work- 
ng more than peers is negatively related to both job and career satisfaction. This 
eems to suggest that the “job utility function” is different from the general utility 
unction. A wish for conformity in working time may enter the former even if it is 
bsent in the latter. 
23 We also conducted the same robustness checks on the model presented in col- 
mn 4 of Table 4 , and they led to the same conclusions. 
24 The correlation coeﬃcient between peer working time and peer income is 0.24. 
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ncolumn 2, we estimate the model without imputed values of
peer household income, in order to check whether the imputa-
tion of peer income introduces some error that would lead to
overestimating the effect of peer hours. In this speciﬁcation, the
coeﬃcient on the dummy for working less than peers is quite
similar, although statistical signiﬁcance is lower, probably due
to the reduced sample size. This suggests that imputation of
peer household income for some respondents does not bias our
results. In column 3, we use an alternative for peer household
income: the extent to which a respondent thinks his income is
higher than that of others in his environment. Respondents of
the CentER data panel were asked to rate their agreement with
a number of general statements about their relative income. 25 
We compute an average measure based on the answers to these
questions. The coeﬃcient on working less than peers still re-
mains similar, although statistical signiﬁcance drops below the
conventional thresholds due to the reduced sample size. Admit-
tedly, the three alternative measures of relative income used
here are also measured with error, and their relationship with
happiness is either found to be weak or measured imprecisely.
This means that one cannot entirely exclude the possibility that
peer hours capture some part of a relative income effect. How-
ever, our results suggest that relative working time has an ef-
fect on happiness that goes beyond its impact on relative in-
come. Still, a worker’s relative working time could inﬂuence
well-being because it is a predictor of good career perspectives
and therefore of lifetime income ( Landers et al., 1996 ) or be-
cause it is associated with consumption on the job (in the form
of additional material beneﬁts). 
2. Second, because men who work less than their peers are likely
to work part-time, the coeﬃcient on peer weekly working time
could capture the effect of working part-time on happiness.
Booth and Van Ours (20 08, 20 09) have shown that full-time
jobs maximize the happiness of men. To check for this possi-
bility, we estimate the model including an additional dummy
variable indicating whether the individual works part-time. 26 
The results are presented Table C.11. In the speciﬁcation which
includes peer working hours as a continuous variable (column25 The statements were as follows: (1) “Compared to others in my environment, 
 am better off”; (2) “I think I have more assets than others in my environment”; 
3) “Other people in my environment have more money to spend than I”; (4) “If I 
ompare myself with my friends, I think in general I am ﬁnancially better off”; (5) 
I can spend more on durable consumer goods than others in my environment”. 
26 Part-time is deﬁned as 32 hours per week or less. Changing this deﬁnition does 
ot lead to substantial changes in the results. 
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28 In addition, the coeﬃcient on peer income crosses the threshold for statistical 
signiﬁcance, which is probably be due to increased power since we gain about a 
thousand observations. 
29 A further potential source of endogeneity could be reverse causality. It would 
play a role if being happy had an inﬂuence on the choice of working hours and 
the choice of peers. We attempted to tackle this problem by using instrumental 
variables for individuals’ own and peer working hours as speciﬁed in column 4 of 1), working part-time is negatively and statistically signiﬁcantly
related to happiness, and the coeﬃcient on peer working hours
remains unchanged. In the speciﬁcation containing dummies
for working more or less than peers, the coeﬃcients on these
dummies and on the part-time dummy become a bit smaller
and lose their statistical signiﬁcance. This is probably due to
the fact that the correlation coeﬃcient between the dummy for
working less than peers and for working part-time is very high
(0.61). Still, the magnitude of the coeﬃcient on working less
than peers remains similar. Although it could be that working
less than one’s peers captures some of the effect of working
part-time, we cannot conclude that working part-time explains
away the negative effect of peer working hours for men. 
3. Third, as mentioned in Section 3 , working time mismatches
may be a confounder of the relation between happiness and re-
ports of peer working time. For instance, someone who would
like to work more than he does may for that reason both be
less happy and overestimate the working time of his peers. To
rule out this source of bias, we control for over- and under-
employment in the model. 27 Estimation results are presented
in Table C.12. Working time mismatches have a negative, very
weak and statistically insigniﬁcant relation with happiness. In-
cluding these controls in the model leaves the coeﬃcient on
working less than peers virtually unchanged. 
4. Next, as in the case of labour supply, we want to control for the
inﬂuence of peer characteristics other than working time and
income. We therefore estimate a model controlling for the peer
characteristics that are measured in our dataset. The estimation
results are presented in Table C.13. The coeﬃcients on the ad-
ditional controls are not signiﬁcant and the coeﬃcient on peer
working time does not change, which indicates that exogenous
effects do not bias our estimation results. 
5. We argued above that the use of individual ﬁxed effects elim-
inates potential time-invariant confounding factors. To check
this argument, we also estimate a pooled version of our model
(see Table C.14). The dummy for working less than peers turns
out to be insigniﬁcant in the pooled model. This hints towards
the presence of unobserved characteristics, possibly shared
with peers, that would attenuate the negative relation between
working less than peers and happiness. We conclude that what
is negatively associated with happiness is not so much being an
individual who works less than his peers, but rather getting to
work less than one’s peers, given all one’s own and peer char-
acteristics. 
6. One might further be worried that other variables in the mod-
els estimated are endogenous (income, peer income, job satis-
faction, health, partner, number of children) and that this en-
dogeneity biases the coeﬃcients on our variables of interest.
However, when the model is estimated without these poten-
tially endogenous control variables, the estimated coeﬃcients
on an individuals’ own working time and working more or less
than peers remain similar (full results available from the au-
thors). 
7. Another potential source of concern is the idea that a job
change could affect one’s own working time, peer working
time, and happiness at the same time, therefore driving a spu-
rious relation between these variables. We do not directly ob-
serve job changes in our data, but we can construct a measure
of job tenure. Including this measure as a control in our model
or a dummy for recent job changers (with job tenure shorter
than a year or shorter than two years) does not affect the coef-27 Overemployment is deﬁned as the number of hours that a respondent actually 
works per week above his desired weekly working time. Underemployment is de- 
ﬁned as the number of hours that a respondent would have to work more per week 
in order to meet his desired weekly working time. 
T
f
t
cﬁcient on one’s own working time or on working more or less
than peers (full results available from the authors). 
8. For the reader worried that focusing on only working men with
working peers might somehow distort the results, we also esti-
mated our main models while including non-working men and
men with non-working peers. The results remain similar (full
results available from the authors). 28 
ll robustness checks show that the negative coeﬃcient on work-
ng less than peers that we found in our main model holds when
e use different methods aiming at excluding different sources of
puriousness or bias. 29 It has to be stressed, however, that both an
ndividual’s own working time and peer working time are mea-
ured by the respondents’ answers to survey questions. Strictly
peaking, we can therefore only say that men are less happy if they
ave the feeling that they work less than their male peers. 
. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have correlated a unique measure of peer
orking time with both individual working time and individual
appiness, to better understand how peer working time enters an
ndividual’s utility function. This enabled us to shed light on the
rivers of peer effects in labour supply. We used the Dutch CentER
anel and focused on men of working age. We used the respon-
ents’ answer to the question: ‘If you think of the men among your
cquaintances, how many hours per week do they work on aver-
ge?’. A ﬁrst descriptive look at the data conﬁrms that the use of
his unique measure of peer working time has added value com-
ared with constructs based on individual characteristics, because
ndividuals often report peer characteristics that differ from their
wn. Our results hinge on the assumption, supported by empiri-
al ﬁndings, that biases in reports about peer working time do not
lay an important role in our data. 
We presented three different models of the role peer working
ime can play in an individual’s utility function. In the ﬁrst model,
ndividuals imitate their peers’ labour supply because peer work-
ng time generates externalities for them that directly affect the
arginal utility they obtain from work or leisure. In the second
odel, people derive utility from conforming to their peers’ labour
upply behaviour because the latter constitutes a social norm. In
he third model, individuals derive status from the difference be-
ween their peers’ working time and their own. This third model
an take two forms: In the conspicuous leisure model, individuals
erive status from working less than others because this is inter-
reted as evidence of aﬄuence. On the contrary, in the conspicu-
us work model, status is derived from working a great deal and
herefore individuals derive utility from working more or not work-
ng less than their peers. All three models predict a positive effect
f peer labour supply on one’s own labour supply, but they differ
ith respect to their predictions about the effect of peer working
ime on happiness. able 4 . As instruments for one’s own working time, we used the constraints on the 
respondents’ labour supply, measured as the difference between the desired weekly 
working time reported by the respondents and their actual weekly working time. 
The instrument we used for peer working time was peer age, but the F-statistic 
or the ﬁrst stage indicated that it was not a very strong instrument. Peer working 
ime, when instrumented, remained negative and signiﬁcant. The endogeneity test 
ould not reject the exogeneity of the working time variables. 
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M  In line with all three models, we ﬁnd evidence of peer effects
n men’s working time, in the sense that a man works more hours
he longer his male peers work. This evidence is in line with the
arlier results of Aronsson et al. (1999) , Weinberg et al. (2004) , and
rodner and Kniesner (2008) . To distinguish between the three
odels, we studied the link between peer labour supply and hap-
iness. We ﬁnd that peer labour supply is negatively related to
en’s happiness, controlling for one’s own working time, one’s
wn income, and peer income, and in particular that men are less
appy if they work less than their male peers. This ﬁnding is con-
istent with the conspicuous work model. The relations we ﬁnd
eem to be robust to a number of potential sources of bias or spu-
iousness. 
Our results are in line with a conspicuous work model with
omparison-concave utility (i.e. decreasing marginal utility of sta-
us), convex costs of working time, and non-increasing marginal
rivate utility of working time ( Clark and Oswald, 1998 ). A pref-
rence for status derived from work induces men to follow their
eers’ labour supply but, because of the decreasing marginal utility
f status and the increasing marginal net costs of working more,
hey do not engage in an explosive rat race. It is worth noting that
ur results do not necessarily imply an increasing trend in work-
ng time at the macro level. The fact that individuals tend to follow
heir peers can also explain a downward trend in weekly working
ime. 30 In the conspicuous work model, a decrease in peer working
ime (e.g. due to an external shock) allows men to decrease their
wn working time without losing status. 
These results shed light on the motivations behind following
ehaviour in terms of working time. A better understanding of
uch motivations can be important for the design of incentives.
or instance, Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2013) examine the
mplications for taxation of taking into account not only the role
layed by relative consumption, but also the implications of con-
picuous leisure, and conclude that while conspicuous consump-
ion calls for progressive taxation, conspicuous leisure would jus-
ify regressive taxation in some cases and not affect optimal taxa-
ion in others. Similarly, Mujcic and Frijters (2015) ﬁnd evidence
hat individuals are motivated by conspicuous health on top of
onspicuous consumption, which would call for lower marginal tax
ates than conspicuous consumption alone would justify. If, as we
nd in this paper, individuals are motivated by conspicuous work,
he case for progressive taxation becomes stronger again. 
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